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Abstract
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) uses performance incentives to encourage more efficient
provision of services. The incentive mechanism adopted potentially suffers from information problems.
Performance standards imperfectly reflect policy goals explicitly stated in terms of changes in employment
and earnings. Existing standards measure levels of employment and earnings following training.
Therefore, they may induce subcontractors to become more effective teachers or training providers may
take advantage of the moral hazard problem associated with not using value-added measures by
substituting harder-to-train clients with those more easily placed in high-wage jobs (cream-skimming).
This study exploits state level variation in JTPA incentives to examine how training providers
respond to the JTPA incentive system. Using a random sample drawn from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, the study proceeds in three steps. First, I model the probability that an individual is
enrolled in a JTPA training program and find that higher incentives encourage enrollment of individuals
with more work experience. This may reflect service providers targeting services to individuals for whom
the value-added is largest or it may arise from the moral hazard problem. Therefore, I analyze whether
value-added is higher for more experienced enrollees and whether stronger incentives lead to higher value-
added. I find support for the existence of moral hazard. However, holding all else equal, stronger
incentives increase value-added.
The study provides strong evidence that non-random selection of participants by administrators
is a statistically important effect and adds empirical content to the literature on the use of incentive
contracts to resolve principal-agent problems.
Section 1 - Introduction
While theoretically incentive contracts can create perverse incentives, the empirical understanding
of these effects is under-developed. Suppose an educational authority wants to elicit higher teacher effort
and therefore bases teachers' salaries upon students' performance. Evidence that those enrolled have higher
ability than those eligible for the program is not evidence that teachers substituted better students for more
teaching effort. An identification problem exists because differences could simply arise from more
intelligent students applying to the program. To solve this identification problem, the researcher needs
a variable which exogenously alters the teachers' selection criteria but does not alter the students'
propensity to apply to the program. State variation in the implementation of the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) provides such an environment thereby allowing tests of problems derived from incentive
theory.
The JTPA, which replaced its precursor the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
in 1982, is the major federal program for providing job training to the poor. Its main innovation over
CETA was the introduction of a performance-contingent incentive system. The critical design element
in the JTPA system is the selection of standards which reflect policy goals explicitly stated in terms of
changes in employment and earnings and a reduction in welfare dependency. However, implementation
problems precluded adopting a set of value-added performance measures and instead the standards used
in practice only measure levels of employment and earnings following training. Thus, the JTPA problem
of how to design incentives when it is difficult to monitor performance is a classic agency problem.2
Post-training level standards may have several effects. First, they may successfully increase the
subcontractors' training efforts and induce them to become more effective teachers. Alternatively, because
provider performance is measured by post-training outcomes, a moral hazard problem could exist: training
providers may substitute harder-to-train clients with individuals for whom measured performance would
be high even in the absence of training. By selecting more able individuals from the applicant pool, these
providers may be engaging in a form of "cream-skimming." Of course, these effects are not mutually
exclusive: high effort combined with cream-skimming may lead to providing training to those for whom
the value-added is largest. In short, the performance standards adopted may either raise or decrease "the
basic return on investment (as) measured by the increased employment and earnings of participants and
the reduction in welfare dependency."3
2See Cragg (1993), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992).
'Section 106 of the Job Training Partnership Act.
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Using data from the National Survey of Youth, this paper investigates training provider responses
to the JTPA performance incentives by studying whether state variation in incentive policy has led to
differences in earnings growth and cream-skimming. I find evidence that higher incentives encourage
more "cream-skimming." This may reflect service providers targeting services to individuals for whom
the value-added is largest or it may be a negative selection effect associated with the program's using post-
training outcome measures instead of value-added measures. This suggests using measures of labor market
outcomes commensurate with program goals to analyze whether stronger incentives lead to higher value-
added. As such a value-added measure, I use the increase in the annual earnings differential controlling
for whether individuals were experienced workers. I find that in states with higher incentives, value-
added is higher. However, in addition to this positive incentive effect negative selection also occurs. In
a policy simulation which accounts for the demographic composition of the positive incentive and negative
selection effects, I find that the positive incentive effect overwhelms the selection effect so that overall,
higher incentives lead to the more efficient provision of JTPA training services.
This paper adds to the growing literature4 on implementation problems of providing education and
other public goods through decentralized institutional arrangements. In particular, it is the first study that
empirically investigates the moral hazard problem associated with using performance monitoring in
educational systems.5 Thus this work adds empirical content to the burgeoning literature on the effect of
incentive contracts to resolve principal-agent problems.6 While there exists a well developed theoretical
literature which is predicated on the notion that moral hazard in contractual relationships is a first-order
effect there is little systematic evidence of this assumption.71 find that when performance standards suffer
from potential problems of moral hazard, agents will take advantage of the information problems and
violate program-designers' intent.
4See Barnow (1992) and Dickinson and West (1988).
5The paper is a natural complement to the work of Anderson, Burkhauser and Raymond (1993) and Dickinson
and West (1988) which investigates the impact of JTPA performance policy on clients, services and costs. While
both papers provide interesting results, neither uses data which allow them to investigate notions of cream-skimming,
moral hazard and efficient targeting of JTPA services using measures of performance consistent with JTPA policy
goals.
6See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992).
'Exceptions are the work of Krueger (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1991) and Staten and Umbeck (1982).
Section 2 - JTPA Incentive Structures and Training Provider Responses
The JTPA provides a separate role for each member of the federal-state-local hierarchy of
government. At the federal level, the Department of Labor chooses performance standards to be used by
States for monitoring and rewarding local SDAs.8 Although the DOL is mandated to choose standards
that stimulate gains in wages, employment and reductions in welfare receipt, standards based upon
absolute levels following training were adopted.9 This produces the problem that training providers
receive the same credit for placing individuals with significantly different attributes: results for a person
with limited reading or language skills would be treated identically to those for an accomplished student.
State governors have discretion over designing incentives. They establish policies regarding the
distribution of rewards to and sanctions of SDAs. SDAs make decisions regarding who is enrolled, the
types of services that are offered, the types of contracts used and the selection of service providers. A
survey of SDAs found that 30 percent desired rewards to maintain budgets while 10 percent cited public
relations value as a significant reason to do well vis-a-vis other SDAs.10
JTPA services are restricted predominantly to low-income individuals. After an income test,
participant selection strategies range from first-come/first-served policies, to taking everyone willing to
participate, to giving applicants priority based upon test scores, employment experience, or educational
attainment. JTPA intake may be conducted by the SDA, public schools, the Employment Service,
community organizations, for-profit agencies or government agencies. The contractors providing training
can be community colleges, high schools, non-profit providers, for-profit groups or employers. 78% of
SDAs use performance-based contracts for training services as a means of ensuring the effective provision
of services.11 In these contracts, more than three-quarters of all contracts make at least 25 percent of the
payment contingent on performance.
To measure the effect of JTPA performance incentives on the behavior of SDAs and their
subcontractors, I need to develop measures of the cross-state variation in incentive intensity. Variation
The country has been partitioned into 620 Service Delivery Areas (SDAs).
'Four adult performance measures have been used through 1987: the employment rate following training, the
employment rate of welfare recipients, the average wage rate of those employed following training, and the cost per
trainee who entered employment. There are also three youth (less than 21) standards: the employment rate following
training, the "positive-termination rate", and the cost per positive termination where a "positive termination" is
defined as a youth entering employment, full-time school or achieving schooling goals.
"Dickinson and West(1988), p.117.
"National Commission for Employment Policy Survey, question Fl.
in incentive intensity can be characterized by the fraction of SDA budgets exposed to performance
evaluation, the idiosyncratic variation in performance standards, and the accuracy of the performance
assessment.12 Ideal measures would characterize the variation in the standards due to performance
differences and idiosyncratic risk, and the fraction of SDA and subcontractor budgets which are contingent
on performance.
I use a data set collected in 1986 for the National Commission on Employment Policy to develop
state level proxies for incentive variation in: the size of awards; the risk associated with winning awards;
and the risk associated with being punished. Differences in the size and distribution of awards arise
through the percentage of the state budget dedicated to performance awards and the allocation formulas
dictating their distribution. Most states use a formula which relates award size to the amount by which
standards are exceeded. While I would like to be able to define a variable which measures the proportion
of per-trainee reimbursement which is contingent on performance, the NCEP data does not allow its
definition. However, the fraction of the state budget dedicated to awards should be related to this ideal
measure. The variable defined to capture this is called AWARDSIZE. Because JTPA funds are rationed,
this variable will be directly correlated with the ideal measure under the assumption that across states
SDAs have the same average expenditure per enrollee.13 This variable is viewed as a proxy for the degree
of incentive intensity and the proportion of SDAs1 budget which is contingent on performance.
The likelihood of receiving an award in a state depends on the levels of standards and the number
of standards that must be passed. This likelihood falls as the standards become stricter and as the number
of qualifying standards rises. There is little variation in the levels of these standards but there are
considerable differences in the number of standards that must be passed. This variation is captured by
the policy variable CARROT which indicates the number of standards that must be passed to qualify for
12See Cragg (1993) for models of the contracting relationship between states and service providers.
13This is illustrated in the following accounting identities
% state budget used for awards = J^ awards[]P awards + J^ noncontingent payments]"1
awards
number state trainees
Y] awards + V noncontingent payments
number state trainees
= state average per trainee award = R ^ ^ a y e r a g e p e f t r a i n e e
state average cost per trainee
where in the last step I assume that the state average cost per trainee is a constant K across states. This would be
unlikely if the JTPA were over-funded so that some states were unable to recruit enough trainees to use the funds
efficiently.
an award.14 This variable is related to the amount of risk to which a SDA is exposed. SDA risk is
sensitive to local economic conditions and attributes of the applicant pool15 because low trainee wages and
placement rates might be observed either due to poor services or because of a temporary regional
depression. In addition, economic fluctuations and regional factors may affect the ability levels of the
applicant pool.16 The Department of Labor's adjustment model corrects for observed variation in fourteen
factors specific to the SDA. Almost all states use the DOL adjustment model thereby exposing SDAs to
less risk. However, using multiple standards to determine award eligibility is likely to increase the amount
of idiosyncratic risk to which SDAs are exposed because most of the performance standards are probably
positively correlated.17 Like AWARDSIZE, a higher value of CARROT corresponds to greater incentives
to perform well.
Analogously, the probability of being punished depends on the number of standards that must be
passed. This probability rises as the standards become more exacting and falls as the allowable number
of failed standards rises. This variation is captured by the variable STICK, which measures the number
of standards that may be failed before sanctioning is required. Again, a higher value of STICK
corresponds to higher incentives.
Finally, some states believe the DOL model is inadequate for correcting for both temporal and
local geographic economic factors which affect SDA performance. For SDAs that have marginally failed,
these states have formalized application processes for SDAs to make special appeals for unexpected
difficulties associated with their clients served, services offered or economic conditions. The variable ADJ
indicates whether a state used formalized adjustment procedures beyond the DOL model. SDAs in states
with adjustment policies should reduce the degree of cream-skimming and offer riskier but higher return
services because they are exposed to less idiosyncratic risk and thus can afford to take chances.
14The NCEP data do not allow me to identify which standards must be passed.
15For instance, outcomes might vary not only because trainers expend different levels of effort but also because
of idiosyncratic shocks to local economies. A region dominated by sunset industries is susceptible to unexpected
plant closures which affect local wages and unemployment rates.
"Locations in urban slums where educational achievement is low may provide an intake population that is difficult
to train: abnormally high unemployment in the area might lead to more skilled applicants.
17If an SDA is required to pass only 1 standard from a set of 7, it will focus on the one with the lowest variance
beyond its control, and the one that is easiest to pass (call is PA with variance aA). The risk associated with this is
aa. If a second standard is required, the risk moves from aa to aA + aB + 2aAB. If the covariance between the two
standards a^ is positive, the risk is unambiguously increased.
Section 3 - Empirical Models to Capture Local Responses to JTPA Performance Policy
Variation in the state level incentive structure provides a "natural experiment" to understand
whether higher incentives motivate the provision of more effective services, and/or encourage enrollment
of more employable individuals. If the designed standards successfully mirror program goals, then an
increase in incentives as reflected by higher values of AWARDSIZE, CARROT and STICK should induce
program operators to provide better training services: increases in employment and earnings should be
greater in higher incentive states. However, higher incentives may also encourage cream-skimming
because the standards adopted measure the levels of post-training employment and earnings. Thus, higher
values of AWARDSIZE, CARROT and STICK may also lead to the enrollment of individuals with higher
levels of human capital from the applicant pool but for whom the value-added is lower, contrary to
program goals. Finally, states where ADJ takes on a value of 1, should have less cream-skimming because
the problems associated with just failing to attain standard thresholds are minimized. In addition, the use
of adjustment policies for extraordinary circumstances may encourage program innovation because the
consequences of SDA failure might be mitigated by appealing to the state for allowances.
Is there Cream-Skimming?
The impact of performance policy on the enrolled population is measured by the probability that
an individual eligible for training is observed to be enrolled. Thus, data on both the eligible and the
enrolled population are necessary. I use data from the NLSY18 to determine whether individuals eligible
during a one-year period19 were enrolled in a training program. The observation of an individual entering
a training program is dependent on three conditions being satisfied. First, the individual must be from
the eligible population. Second, the net expected benefits from participating in the program must be
positive for the individual to apply. Third, the applicant must be chosen for enrollment by the program
administrator.
An individual applies for training if the net benefits are positive. Net benefits may be thought of
as the difference between the discounted stream of earnings increases for the training program and the
costs of participation. Costs of participation include foregone wages, transportation and child care. The
level of foregone wages depends on the attained level of human capital, which is measured by educational
18See Appendix for details on how the sample is constructed.
"Federal training programs during both the CETA and JTPA periods mandated that 90 percent of training
recipients be disadvantaged which is defined at a point in time as being a member of a family whose income from
the past six months is below a cut-off or whose income includes government welfare payments.
attainment and past labor force experience. The foregone wage level also varies by age, race and sex.
Costs of participation are likely to be lower if the individual lives at home and is married but higher if
he has children. Because many states require that some welfare recipients participate in a training
program, an indicator of welfare receipt is also a control variable.
The previous section discussed the factors that influence program administrators' choice of
applicants. Geographic variation in the cream-skimming incentive arises in two ways. First, JTPA funding
formulas ensure that states with high unemployment receive greater funding.20 Thus, states with higher
levels of unemployment should have higher enrollment rates. In addition, states with higher
unemployment are likely to have more cream-skimming because layoffs both swell the applicant pool and
raise its quality therefore allowing administrators to be more selective. The second type of geographic
variation arises due to state differences in the implementation of JTPA incentive policy. In states where
AWARDSIZE, CARROT, and STICK are higher there are greater incentives for service providers to meet
and exceed performance standards. In states where ADJ is equal to 1 there should be less cream-
skimming.
Temporal variation in incentives arises through the regime shift from CETA to the JTPA in 1983.
Enrollment probabilities should be higher during the period in which CETA was in place because it was
more generously funded therefore allowing higher enrollment. In addition, cream-skimming should be
lower during CETA because there was no performance-dependent incentive system in place.
Three events dictate the observation that an eligible individual is enrolled or not enrolled: (1) an
eligible individual does not apply; (2) an eligible individual applies but is not accepted for enrollment;
and, (3) an eligible individual applies for enrollment and is accepted into the program. However, the data
used in this study allow the identification of only state (3) and the joint event, either (1) or (2). Therefore,
a natural framework for studying this problem is simply to use a reduced form model of the probability
that an eligible individual is enrolled. Define a latent index I = XfZ + u composed of an observed portion
X{5 and an unobserved part u. When / is positive an individual is enrolled in a training program, and the
probability that an individual is enrolled in a training program is P(I > 0). In this framework, a positive
value for ft indicates that for a higher value of X an individual is more likely to be enrolled. If u has a
normal distribution with the variance normalized to one for identification, then the model is a simple
probit and maximum likelihood estimates for this model are consistent and traditional Wald and likelihood
^Two-thirds of JTPA funds are allocated to states based on the distribution of unemployment and the remaining
one-third according to the low income population.
ratio tests may be used.21
This model is estimated for two samples of eligible people drawn from the NLSY. In the first
sample, I use only the JTPA eligible population and first explore whether states with higher unemployment
rates tend to allow administrators to choose more qualified individuals. Second, I examine whether there
is a tendency to enroll individuals with higher levels of human capital in states with more intensive
incentive policy, as indicated by higher values of CARROT, STICK, and AWARDSIZE. In the second
sample, I include both the CETA and JTPA eligible populations and explore the differences in enrollment
probabilities across the two time periods. I examine whether there was less cream-skimming during CETA
and whether the unemployment effect is smaller. In addition, I investigate whether the JTPA targeting
policies for enrolling more minorities, welfare recipients and high school dropouts altered the intake
probabilities.
Estimates for the probit enrollment models are presented in Table 3.1. The first 3 columns are
based upon the JTPA sample while the other columns used the combined CETA/JTPA sample. The first
column presents the basic specification which includes controls for whether the individual was a welfare
recipient, a high school dropout, two age dummies indicating whether the individual was less than 20 and
whether the individual was between 20 and 25, and sex and race dummies. The comparison group is a
white high school graduate who is over 25 and does not collect welfare. Recalling that a positive
coefficient indicates that an increase in the covariate raises the enrollment probability, we see that the
probability of being enrolled is higher for welfare recipients and minorities. In addition, as expected it
is more likely that younger individuals are enrolled. Finally, males and high school dropouts are less
likely to be enrolled though this effect is insignificant.
The second column introduces the first three covariates of interest: the state unemployment rate,
work experience22 and an interaction between the unemployment rate and work experience. Jointly and
individually the three variables are significant at the 5% level. We see that higher unemployment rates
reduce the probability that an individual is enrolled in a JTPA program. Thus, while higher state
unemployment increases the JTPA funds in a state, they are inadequate to overcome the increased eligible
pool as more families slip below the poverty line. Surprisingly, we see that a higher level of work
experience reduces the likelihood that an individual is enrolled in a training program. Thus it seems that
JTPA policy reduces cream-skimming. However, recall that the observation that an individual is enrolled
21Amemiya (1985), Chapter 9.
^Experience is defined as the fraction of time spent employed since the individual has left school.
in a program is based upon two decisions: first an eligible individual applies for training, and second, he
is enrolled by the administrator. To conclude that JTPA policy reduces cream-skimming by simply
examining the coefficient estimate on work experience is incorrect. The relevant coefficient is the
interaction between work experience and the state unemployment rate: it is both positive and significant.
Thus, in states with higher unemployment rates, there is a greater tendency for more experienced
applicants to be enrolled. This effect may be attributed to cream-skimming because administrators are able
to be more selective because unemployment increases the size and 'quality' of the applicant pool (as in
a Roy model).
I exploit the second source of geographic variation in incentives to test for cream-skimming by
interacting the three policy variables CARROT, STICK, and A WARDSIZE with work experience. Positive
coefficients on these interactions are an indication of cream-skimming as is a negative coefficient on the
interaction with ADJ. It is important to also include the policy variables alone because states with higher
incentives may also have higher enrollment rates. After extensive testing, only a specification which
includes both ADJ and CARROT seems warranted because A WARDSIZE and STICK have little explanatory
power.23 Column 3 presents the specification that includes both CARROT and ADJ. The coefficient
estimate on the interaction between ADJ and work experience is negative and significant at the 5% level
indicating that in states with an adjustment policy there tend to be less experienced individuals selected
into the JTPA programs. The interaction between CARROT and work experience is positive which
indicates that in states with more intensive incentives there is a tendency to select more able individuals
into the program. Both of these results are consistent with a cream-skimming hypothesis.
The final three columns in Table 3.1 present evidence for cream-skimming based upon the
temporal variation arising in the shift from the CETA to the JTPA training regime. These estimates are
based upon a pooled population from both the CETA and JTPA periods. The first column presents a
specification that merges the CETA and JTPA effects. Using the same base controls as the previous
section, the covariates include whether the individual was: a welfare recipient, a high school dropout, less
than 20 years old, between 20 and 25 years old, black, hispanic, or male. If we average across the two
periods, we see that minorities, high school dropouts, welfare recipients and younger individuals are more
likely to be enrolled. As before, we see that states with higher unemployment rates have lower enrollment
rates and in states with high unemployment more experienced individuals tend to be enrolled. The second
column presents interactions between a dummy variable indicating that the observation is from the JTPA
3See Cragg (1993) for details.
period and basic characteristics of the population. Positive coefficient estimates on the JTPA interaction
variables indicate that relative to the CETA period, these individuals had a higher selection probability
during the JTPA period. The positive value for the interaction JTPA*Welfare indicates that during the
JTPA period, welfare recipients were more likely to be enrolled relative to nonrecipients. We also see
that younger, whites, females or high school graduates were more likely to be enrolled during the JTPA
period than during the CETA period. Testing suggested that interactions with Welfare, Dropout, and Age
< 20 were significant while those with Black, Hispanic, and Male were not. The final column provides
estimates for the interactions JTPA*Experience, JTPA*Unemployment, and JTPA*
Unemployment*Experience. A likelihood ratio test statistic of 2.22 suggests that from a statistical
perspective across the CETA and JTPA policy shift, the average amount of cream skimming relative to
CETA did not change. While the average level of selection bias between the two periods may have been
similar, the previous analysis indicates that across states the degree of cream-skimming increased.
To gauge the magnitude of the cream-skimming effects, Table 3.2 provides simulated probabilities
based on the parameter estimates from columns 2, 3 and 6 of Table 3.1. Estimated probabilities are
presented for two base populations, low- versus high-experience individuals, in two environments, low-
versus high unemployment.24 The concept relevant to the cream-skimming hypothesis is the REP: the ratio
of the enrollment probabilities for low- versus high-experience individuals in each environment. The REP
is a summary statistic for cream skimming because as the ratio decreases, there is more selection bias in
favor of high-experience individuals. If the ratio is 1, there is no selection bias between the two groups.
The first row shows that a low-experience, black, male, high school dropout in his early twenties (the base
case for the policy simulations), is almost three times as likely to be enrolled as his high-experience
counterpart in low unemployment areas. In a high unemployment area this REP falls to 0.9 indicating
more cream-skimming in high incentive states.
The middle of the table illustrates the impact of incentive policy on the likelihood of enrollment.
The basic trends are partially masked by the fact that enrollment probabilities are higher in states with
adjustment policies and in states with higher incentives. The impact of incentive policy on cream-
skimming is seen by comparing the REPs of low- versus high-experience individuals across incentive
regimes. Thus, to understand the impact of adjustment policies in low- unemployment states, compare
the two pairings for adjustment policies in low- versus high-incentive states. In low-incentive states, we
24Low and high experience correspond to 0.1 and 0.6 respectively while low and high unemployment correspond
to unemployment rates of 4% and 12%.
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see that the adjustment policies have little effect: the relative selection probabilities for a low- versus high-
experience person are 2.9 in a state with adjustment polices versus 2.8 for a state without. However, in
high-incentive states these ratios change from 3.3 to 2.3. Thus, in a high-incentive state with an
adjustment policy, a low-experience individual is 3.3 times more likely to be enrolled in a program
whereas in a state without an adjustment policy, the relative likelihood falls to 2.3.
The impact of incentive policies on selection probabilities is understood by selecting either the
rows where an adjustment policy is in place or those where it is not and then comparing the relative
enrollment probabilities of a low- versus high-experience person. For states without adjustment policies,
we see that: in low-unemployment states, the relative probabilities fall from 2.8 in low-incentive states to
2.3 in high-incentive states; in high-unemployment states, the relative selection probabilities are the same
across the incentive regimes. For states with adjustment policies, we see that: in low-unemployment
states, the relative probabilities rise from 2.9 in low-incentive states to 3.3 in high-incentive states; in high-
unemployment states, the relative selection probabilities are close to being the same across the incentive
regimes. Thus, in high-incentive states without an adjustment policy, cream-skimming effects are large,
but when an adjustment policy is introduced it overcomes the selection bias introduced by higher
incentives.
The bottom of the table makes it readily apparent that selection probabilities during the CETA
period are much higher. During the CETA period, low-experience individuals were always more likely
to be enrolled in a program than their higher experience counterparts. In the JTPA period, this was true
only in low-unemployment states: in high-unemployment states, more experienced individuals were more
likely to be enrolled than their less experienced counterparts. While this may have been the result of
higher application rates by more experienced individuals during the JTPA period, it is consistent with the
hypothesis that the JTPA incentive system gives an incentive to cream-skim more experienced applicants
and that this incentive is higher in states with more unemployment.
Is there a Positive Incentive Effect?
In the previous section I found that more intensive JTPA incentives lead to the enrollment of
individuals with more work experience. While I interpreted this as evidence that service providers were
cream-skimming better qualified applicants instead of providing better services, it is equally plausible that
higher incentives induce service providers to take care in providing services to those for whom value-
added is highest. If value-added is greatest for more experienced individuals, then cream-skimming is a
commendable activity. Because the goals of the JTPA program are to maximize value-added in the sense
that providers are to be rewarded for increased earnings and employment and reduced welfare dependency,
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simply using the JTPA standards as a measure of performance is clearly an inadequate measure of value-
added. To understand whether JTPA incentives increase performance and not just cream-skimming, I use
a measure of performance consistent with the policy goals: the increase in annual earnings from before
to after training.
A traditional analysis of the impact of training on earnings conditional on participating in training
assumes that pre-training earnings (Yu) and post-training earnings (Yi2) are distributed
where Xtfit and eit (t = 1 or 2) are respectively the observed and unobserved portions of earnings. Under
the assumption that eit are independently distributed with zero mean and variance at, the impact of training
on participant earnings is the difference
A positive difference in the parameters on experience is evidence that effective program targeting is being
mislabelled as cream-skimming. JTPA incentives affect program performance if the difference A(q(D))
is a function of service quality q which in turn is a function of the incentive regime D such that dA/dq >
0 and dq/dD > 0. Empirically, this can be captured by including the performance measures as explanatory
variables in Xit and testing whether the pre- and post-training coefficient estimates are significantly
different from zero and each other. If the variables are significant and their difference is positive, then
1 conclude that although the JTPA uses performance standards which do not fully reflect policy goals,
nonetheless they are correlated with desired outcomes: higher incentives induce training providers to
provide better services. However, this statement is only valid if the vector Xit includes controls for factors
that both raise earnings and are correlated with the policy variables. Xit also needs to include variables
that influence administrative cream-skimming. Therefore, the vector Xit also contains controls for age,
education, race, sex, and previous labor market experience. In addition, to avoid incorrectly attributing
state and time effects to the policy variables, I include state unemployment rates and average earnings as
covariates. This assumes that the program has a negligible effect on state unemployment rates and average
earnings.
This traditional model of annual earnings is inadequate because a significant fraction of individuals
both before and after training have zero earnings. In addition, the idiosyncratic portion of individual
earnings is likely to be correlated over time. A simple solution to these problems is to assume a joint
distribution f{eu,ei2) for eit and derive the likelihood function based on the assumption that Yit = 0 ifXitpt
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+ eit < 0. While this bivariate tobit assumption makes for a statistically coherent model that provides a
solution to the problem of a mass point at zero and the cross-time correlation in earnings, it is unappealing
from an economic perspective. The problem is that the same parameters predict both the level of earnings
and the likelihood that earnings are equal to zero. Therefore, I estimate the following 2-period version
of the traditional generalized tobit model
0 if Xi]y1 + eB < 0
+ e if X V + e > 0
j
 v _ r-i^-2 ^i2 J -"-ail c *
a
 " I 0 i / JSTaY2 + e* < 0
This model allows the parameters predicting the level of earnings conditional on having worked in the
year to differ from those predicting the likelihood of zero earnings. Cross-time correlation can be
introduced by assuming that elf e2, e3, e4 are jointly distributed /(elye2,e^e4) with mean zero. Under this
assumption, the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are consistent, and traditional likelihood
ratio and Wald tests are valid.25 Under a multivariate normal assumption, the impact of training on
earnings is the difference
A,. = E[Ya - Ya] = Pr(I2 > 0)E(Yi2\Ii2 > 0) - Pr(Ia > 0)E(Yil\Iil > 0)
where I define Iy = X^Yj + e^.26
Estimates using this model with controls for sex, race, welfare recipiency, being a high school
dropout, and two age dummies indicating whether an individual was less than 20, or between 20 and 25
are presented in Table 3.3. The comparison group is a white high school graduate who is over 25 and
does not collect welfare. In addition, to control for cyclical year effects and to recognize that the policy
variables might also proxy for non-training state effects, I include both the state average unemployment
rate and the state average earnings as control variables. Finally, to control for cream-skimming and to see
^Amemiya (1985), Chapter 4.
26
 The bivariate tobit was tested against the bivariate generalized tobit using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test
developed in Cragg (1993). I calculated the test statistic by partitioning the sample space into 7 cells based on
annual earnings brackets of ($0, $0-$2500, $25OO-$5OOO, $5000-$7500, $750O-$10OOO, $10000-$ 15000, > $15000).
The tobit model soundly rejects the null that the parametric specification is correct while the generalized tobit did
not.
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to whom the greatest value added may be attributed, I include work experience27 as the final basic control
variable. In addition to the control variables, policy variables are included in both Xi and X2. State
incentive policies are permitted only to shift the means of the pre- and post-training earnings distributions.
I allow the policy variables to shift both the pre-enrollment and post-training means for the following
reason: while the policy variables are intended to proxy for trainers' efforts and the quality of their
training, they are also likely to be correlated with unobserved factors which inflate or deflate earnings
which are not controlled for by the state, demographic, and human capital variables. Unlike in the probit
equations, I exclude interactions between the policy variables because of the paucity of data.
Both the significance and magnitude of the parameter estimates on the policy and experience
variables are important attributes in judging whether incentive policy has a beneficial impact on JTPA
performance. In the first column, the estimated model excludes the policy variables while in the second
column they are included. From top to bottom, the parameter estimates are divided into the pre- and post-
training estimates. A positive coefficient corresponds to an increase in the level of expected earnings.
Across the pre-enrollment and post-enrollment periods, the parameters are qualitatively consistent and jibe
with economic intuition: older white male high school graduates who have more work experience have
higher annual earnings both before and after training.28 Individuals who live in states with high levels of
unemployment or low-average earnings have lower annual earnings both before and after training. In
addition, the covariance between past and future earnings is positive in the two tobit models.
With regards to the cream-skimming hypothesis, the interesting coefficients are those for work
experience. For both the employment probability and the level of earnings conditional on working, we
see that the difference between the pre-training and post-training experience parameters are less than zero.29
For both the levels and the probability of positive earnings, this difference is significantly different from
zero. While this indicates that there is a negative selection effect, at the same time there may be a
positive incentive effect in that holding all else equal, higher incentives may lead to greater value-added.
vExperience is again defined as the fraction of time spent employed since the individual has left school.
findings presented in this section are consistent with those found with either a simple OLS or a bivariate
tobit specification.
29I am using the term difference in the parameters loosely. Strictly speaking one needs to refer to
dE(YQ) - E(YU)
where X refers to the policy variable and a13 = 0 and a24 = 0.
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Therefore, the other parameters of interest are the four policy variables A WARDSIZE, CARROT, STICK,
and ADJ in the second set of estimates presented in Table 3.3. The theory predicts that the value-added
measure might be either higher or lower in high-incentive states because of the moral hazard problem.
On the other hand, if higher incentives lead to both a selection effect and better services, then the
parameter difference should be positive when we control for the selection effect (by including work
experience). For each pre- and post-training pair, the difference is positive but not significantly different
to zero. Thus, higher incentives lead to both a negative selection effect and a positive incentive effect:
higher incentives encourage enrollment of individuals for whom the value-added is lower; and, higher
incentives generate higher value-added holding all else equal. While the negative selection effect is
statistically significant, the positive incentive effect is not.
Because the magnitudes of the parameter estimates are difficult to interpret, simulation results for
a variety of scenarios are presented in Table 3.4. I present the expected earnings differentials for low-
and high-experience individuals.30 In the first two columns, the expected value is calculated from the
specification that omits the policy variables and includes the JTPA dummy. To be comparable to the
previous section, the other four columns present the earnings differential in states with and without an
adjustment policy and in low- versus high-incentive states as measured by CARROT.31 The first pattern
that emerges is that the value-added measure is always higher for low-experience individuals than high-
experience individuals. During the CETA period the increase from high- to low-experience individuals
is $1,500 whereas during the JTPA period it is $2,100. The second pattern is that in all cases (low- versus
high-experience and with or without an adjustment policy), the predicted earnings difference in high-
incentive states is higher than that for low-incentive states. In all cases, the difference between the value-
added is between $1,100 and $2,700 which is 20% to 100% higher than the low-incentive measure. While
one must be cautious regarding their statistical significance, the point estimates suggest that higher
incentives lead to a rise in the value-added from training programs despite incentives being based only
upon post-training outcomes measures. The third pattern is that states with an adjustment policy always
have a higher value-added than those without. The increase in the value-added ranges from $800 to
$3,000. This increase arises mainly from a reduction in pre-training earnings measures and not from
differences in post-training outcomes suggesting that adjustment policies significantly reduce the incentives
^Again I calculate the simulated probabilities and expected values for a white male high school dropout between
20 and 25 years of age living in a state with an unemployment rate of 7.3% and state average earnings of $21,000.
31Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the simulation results are similar for the variables STICK and A WARDSIZE.
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to cream-skim and thus tend to enroll individuals with lower earnings.32
Does the Positive Incentive Effect Dominate the Negative Selection Effect?
The implemented JTPA performance standards are imperfectly correlated with the Act's training
objectives. While I find that higher standards lead to performance increases as measured by the increase
in annual earnings, they are also associated with a significant moral hazard problem. Higher incentives
encourage the enrollment of individuals with more work experience for whom measured performance is
higher but for whom value-added performance is lower. Thus, in implementing higher incentives, there
is a trade-off between increasing value-added and shifting the enrolled population to groups with lower
value-added. The question of whether the positive incentive effect dominates the negative selection effect
depends on the population distribution of high- and low-experience individuals. If there are relatively
more high-experience individuals to whom the training population is shifted through cream-skimming
responses by administrators, then the selection effect is likely to dominate the positive incentive effect as
relatively more individuals are enrolled for whom the value-added is lower. However, if the eligible
population is predominantly low-experience then increasing incentives is likely to increase overall program
performance because most of the enrolled population will still be individuals for whom value-added is
higher. I resolve this trade-off by simultaneously simulating both the selection effect and value-added
across the population. This relies on data which characterizes the joint distribution of work experience (E)
and individual attributes (X) within the JTPA eligible population (f(E,X)). The total value-added for a
particular incentive regime is the following sum over all individuals of the product of the probability that
they participate in a JTPA training program and the total value-added from participating
(enrolled | X,E) E(Y2 - Y1 | E,X) f(E,X) dEdX
o
The previous two sections developed estimates of Pr(enrolledlX,E) and E(Y2 - YJXJE). The NLSY
32I assume that the differences between the CETA and JTPA trained individuals could be modelled as a simple
intercept shift. An alternative model would allow the parameters on the basic socio/economic variables to differ
across the CETA and JTPA trained individuals. I estimated a fully interacted model without the policy variables
and formed a likelihood ratio test of
Ho: CETA and JTPA can be pooled except for the intercept
The test statistic was 11.75 with 16 degrees of freedom. I also focused on the variables which were individually
significant in this regression to see whether they could be pooled. A similar likelihood ratio test was formed for the
specification that allowed the four variables state unemployment rate, state average earnings, male and experience
to differ across the two periods. The likelihood ratio test statistic was 9.8. Thus, we can be confident that the
estimates can be pooled across the two training regimes.
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provides a measure of the distribution f(E,X) so that it is possible to calculate the net trade-off between
the positive incentive effect and the negative selection effect of using higher incentives.
Policy simulations for four incentive regimes are presented in Table 3.5. Two patterns are
apparent: first, the high-incentive with an adjustment policy regime provides the greatest value-added,
and, the low-incentive without an adjustment policy provides the lowest value-added; and second, the
high-incentive with an adjustment policy regime serves the greatest fraction of the eligible population
while the low-incentive without an adjustment policy regime serves the fewest number. Thus using the
JTPA eligible population from the NLSY, I find that whereas higher incentives could have reduced JTPA
performance, they in fact both increase total value-added, value-added per individual, and overall access
to the program. Although it was apparent that employing higher incentives led to a tradeoff between
performance increases as measured by value-added and cream-skimming that shifts the enrolled population
to a group for whom value-added is lower, it was unclear which of the two effects dominated. The
evidence from this simulation suggests that although the moral hazard problems associated with imperfect
performance measurement could have overwhelmed the increases in training quality and effort associated
with higher incentives, in reality they do not.
Is this a Natural Experiment?
Depending on temporal and geographic variation in JTPA incentive policy as a means of
identifying cream-skimming and positive incentive effects may have several shortcomings. With regards
to the enrollment probabilities, what I interpret as selection differences arising from rational variation in
program administrators' behavior, can also be argued to arise from other factors. First, the selection
variation may represent application differences across regimes. For instance, more experienced individuals
might be more likely to apply in high-unemployment areas and an administrator randomly choosing
enrollees would still choose a more experienced group for training. Alternatively across incentive regimes,
higher application rates for more experienced individuals might arise because higher incentives might
generate a reputation effect whereby it becomes a common perception within high-incentive communities
that high-experience individuals are more likely to be enrolled. This would dissuade less experienced
individuals from applying. In addition, higher incentives might lead to more SDA advertising which might
be more persuasive for high-experience individuals. Any of these effects would shift the composition of
the applicant pool in favor of more experienced workers. Both of these arguments suggest that what I
report as a cream-skimming effect instead reflects spurious correlation between the policy variables and
the state average levels of work experience. As a simple check that what I report as a cream-skimming
effect does not simply reflect spurious correlation between the policy variables and the state average levels
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of work experience, I calculated the correlation between the policy variables and the state average level
of work experience. These correlations are close to zero in most cases: CARROT -0.074 (0.60), STICK
-0.034 (0.81), AWARDSIZE 0.005 (0.97), and ADJ -0.188 (0.19).33 As a second check of how well the
policy variables capture solely JTPA policy differences, I estimated the JTPA specifications using data
from the CETA period. If the policy variables are truly proxies for JTPA state incentive differences and
not simply state differences, then the policy variables should be insignificant during the CETA period.
The interactions between AWARDSIZE, CARROT, STICK and EXPERIENCE have very little explanatory
power while the interaction of EXPERIENCE and ADJ can significantly explain a small fraction of the
selection differences during the CETA period. States which use adjustment policies during the JTPA
period also displayed similar selection patterns during the CETA period.
While the previous effects might lead to interpretation problems with the enrollment equations,
for both the enrollment and value-added models, the method adopted relies on exogenous variation in the
geographic and temporal incentive variables while controlling for all other factors correlated with the
policy variables. For instance, because the JTPA versus CETA differences are identified by a time
dummy, I rely on the state average earnings and state unemployment rates to control for all time varying
influences which systematically alter the selection and incentive effects. Alternatively, the cross-incentive
regime deviations are identified by essentially geographic differences which might simply arise from
regional wage effects.
I performed a number of checks to understand whether the regional effects exist. First, maps of
the four primary variables AWARDSIZE, CARROT, STICK, and ADJ show that they are not geographically
correlated thereby alleviating the fear that the policy variables are simply regional dummies. In addition,
the only pairs of variables significantly correlated at the 10 percent level of significance are [CARROT,
STICK], and [AWARDSIZE, STICK] which suggests that linear combinations of the policy variables are
not capturing strictly regional wage and employment effects. Another simple test of the assumption that
the average state unemployment rate and the average state earnings adequately control for state effects is
to estimate the earnings regressions replacing the policy variables with state dummies for the five states
with the largest state population. I found their coefficient estimates to be both small and insignificant.
More convincing evidence of the exogeneity is derived by performing population earnings regressions
based upon data from the entire NLSY sample using models similar to those estimated where I include
both the policy variables and demographic/economic variables as explanatory variables. While the
33The numbers in parentheses are p-values on the hypothesis Ho: p = 0.
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explanatory variables (Experience, DROPOUT, MALE, State Av. Earnings, State Unemployment,
MINORITY, and age dummies) had t-statistics which ranged from 30 to 350, the policy variables were
jointly and usually individually insignificant. Occasionally, the t-statistics for ADJ and AWARDSIZE
occasionally crept up close to 3 but the coefficient estimates still only explained $200 of the difference
in annual earnings. This is convincing evidence that the policy variables are truly explaining differences
in the JTPA incentive regimes and not simply state effects.
Section 7 - Conclusions
The last decade has witnessed the evolution of a new organizational form for the provision of
government services under the Job Training Partnership Act. This legislation decentralized the provision
of training services to the local level, thereby changing the federal and state roles from the direct provision
of services to funding and monitoring the performance of local providers. In contrast to centralized
systems where economic efficiency is maintained through vigilant monitoring, the decentralized JTPA
system attempts to increase economic efficiency by making training providers accountable to performance
measures aligned with policy goals. Incentives to achieve high levels of performance are provided through
rewards for good performance and penalties for poor performance. While this system has made training
providers directly accountable for their actions and should therefore provide economic motivation for the
more effective provision of training services, this study finds that the system has a number of drawbacks.
I find that more intensive incentives lead to moral hazard: training providers tend to enroll
individuals who are more likely to have higher earnings and employment even without training, thereby
potentially inflating the measured success of the program and hampering achievement of program goals.
This does not reflect the targeting of services for whom the value is greatest, rather it is a form of "cream-
skimming" because individuals with more work experience tend to have lower increases in annual earnings
from participation in JTPA training. However, this negative selection effect is balanced by a positive
incentive effect: holding all else equal, I find that more intensive incentives induce greater performance
using a measure consistent with policy goals. This raises the question of whether the JTPA's positive
incentive effects leading to earnings increases dominate the negative motivation to target services to whom
the value-added is lower. The answer to this question depends on the population distribution of individual
characteristics correlated with these two effects. If the JTPA eligible population has relatively few people
to whom the value-added is lower even though their enrollment probability is higher, then the positive
incentive effect will dominate. Simulations examining the relative magnitude of the two effects finds that
the positive incentive effect dominates the moral hazard problem.
These findings have important policy implications. Generally, important lessons should be drawn
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for the design of future systems like educational voucher systems and the performance management
systems mandated for the training components of the Food Stamp Program and AFDC.34 One needs to
be wary of the moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with using performance contingent
pay. More specifically, the JTPA policy reforms introduced in 1988 which reduced the number of
performance standards and focused on collecting longer-run outcomes measures are unlikely to reduce
cream-skimming or produce performance increases. Instead, my findings suggest that standards based
upon changes in employment and earnings relative to what they were before training are likely to spur
greater performance increases.
"The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1988) and the Family Support Act (1988) require that by 1993
performance management systems be incorporated into the Food Stamp and AFDC programs.
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Appendix - Data Description
The NLSY provides data that matches longitudinal earnings and welfare data with the timing of
training, thereby allowing one to determine the population eligible for training all within a representative
sample. The NLSY is an eleven-year longitudinal panel that began annual interviewing of 12,686 youths
between the ages of 14 and 21 in January, 1978. The sample used for estimation retains all observations
until the first missed interview. Thus, by the 11th interview, just over a quarter of the sample were no
longer observed. As is typically done in studies using the NLSY, the military sample was dropped
altogether. The eligible sample is further restricted to only those individuals for whom a complete labor
market history from the last date of schooling is available. Including individuals with incomplete work
history data would introduce initial conditions problems for both labor market experience measures and
the potential presence of past training. Over the 11 years of the resulting panel ending in 1988, the annual
sample ranges from 737 to 3,945 observations for whom there are 467 CETA or JTPA training episodes.
At least 90 percent of CETA and JTPA participants are restricted to be from disadvantaged families.
A disadvantaged family is defined as one which either is collecting welfare or whose income excluding
welfare payments in the last six months falls below the larger of the BLS's lower living standard or the
Department of Agriculture's Poverty Index. An individual is included in the annual eligible population
if the family collected welfare during the year or if in one quarter of the year, the family's previous six
months' income fell below the JTPA or CETA qualifying threshold.35 The eligible sample characteristics
for the 12,026 annual observations on 3,252 individuals are presented in Table Al.
Pre- and post-training annual earnings were collected for those individuals who participated in a
training program and for whom there was a full year of earnings information either before or after the
training episode. Data for the 382 individuals who met this criteria are summarized in Table A2. The
large drop from pre-training to post-training average earnings for those who worked reflects significant
sample composition differences due to missing data: the post-training population is younger and has
accumulated less human capital. If we isolate the 203 individuals for whom there is a full year of earnings
data for both the period prior to training and that following training, we see that there is a $1,637 earnings
increase and we no longer see the aberrant age structure found in the full sample.
35Income and family size are defined as:
•If married, income in the last six months is the sum of individual income from earnings in the last six
months, half of the spouse's annual income, half of the annual farm or self-employment income, half of
annual financial aid, half of income received from others excluding welfare income. Family size is 2 + the
number of children.
•If single and not living with parents, income in the last six months is the sum of individual income from
earnings in the last six months, half of the annual farm or self-employment income, half of annual financial
aid, half of income received from others excluding welfare income. Family size is 1 + the number of
children.
•If single, living with parents and less than 18, income in the last six months is the sum of individual
income from earnings in the last six months, half of the annual farm or self-employment income, half of
annual financial aid, half of income received from others excluding welfare income, and half of the family's
annual income. Family size is 1 + the number of children, the number of siblings, and the number of
parents present.
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Table 3.2 Enrollment Probabilities from Entry Models
Black, male, dropout, 20 < age < 25 (BASE CASE)










Black, male dropout, 20 < age < 25
White, male, high school graduate, 20 < age < 25
JTPA
Black, male dropout, 20 < age < 25
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Table 3.4 Value-Added Outcomes Measures
Low work experience
E(Y2 - Y,)
E(Y, 1 Y, > 0)





E(Y, 1 Y, > 0)





















































































































Age < 20 years
20 years < Age < 25 years
25 years < Age < 30 years








Fraction of time spent working

















































































































On the job training
Classroom based remedial activities
Job specific skills training
Job search skills development
Work experience
Length of training program
Was the program completed?
Number of Observations
Employed




Age < 20 years
20 years < Age < 25 years
25 years < Age < 30 years
Age > 30 years
State unemployment rate
State average earnings
Fraction of time spent working following
departure from school
Weeks since last attended school
Weeks since last attended school
Quarter entered training since 78:1
Restricted Sample
203
0.42
0.57
0.31
0.12
0.46
0.46
0.07
80
4.0
3.9
0.64
0.20
0.62
0.62
0.76
0.15
5.25
0.56
Pre-
training
203
0.63
5318
0.20
0.47
0.45
0.17
0.63
0.20
0.00
8.32
20694
0.31
181
60
21
Post-
training
203
0.73
6955
0.21
0.46
0.46
0.13
0.64
0.22
0.00
8.22
20675
0.31
204
66
22
Full Sample
382
0.45
0.42
0.31
0.27
0.46
0.47
0.07
80
4.1
3.8
0.47
0.39
0.69
0.61
0.77
0.18
6.98
0.59
Pre-
training
261
0.72
9337
0.22
0.4
0.4
0.17
0.43
0.36
0.03
7.16
21450
0.38
242
103
27
Post-
training
324
0.85
7735
0.15
0.5
0.19
0.42
0.49
0.09
0
7.4
21480
0.28
105
38.28
15
28
